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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) of 19801 was initially created in response 
to the discovery of the Love Canal environmental disaster.2 Reacting to 
public outcry and growing awareness of the negative impact of 
environmental wastes, Congress hurriedly addressed the dangers of 
hazardous waste through CERCLA.3 In 1986, Congress enacted the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”) of 
CERCLA.4 
CERCLA allows various parties, either private or public, to bring 
a claim for recovery under Sections 107 and 113. Section 107(a) is the 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. I would like to thank Prof. Hal Morris and Justin Nemunaitis for their 
invaluable help and encouragement. 
1 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000). 
2 Andrew R. Klein, Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Intermediate Landowners: 
Reexamining the Liability-Based Approach, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 337, 340-41. 
(1997). 
3 Id. at 341. 
4 In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Congress extended the 
reauthorization in 1990. See Pub. L. No. 101-508, t.t. XI, § 1123(d), 104 Stat. 1388-
455 (1990).  
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original cost recovery provision of CERCLA.5 Section 113(f) was 
added in 1986 as a part of SARA to allow contribution rights for 
parties liable under CERCLA.6 Section 107(a) provides that “covered 
persons” may be held liable for “any other necessary costs of response 
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan.”7 Section 113(f) states that “[a] person who has resolved its 
liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response 
action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution 
from any person.”8  
Within the cost-recovery framework, the two overriding goals are 
to promote efficiency in environmental cleanup and make the “polluter 
pay” by ensuring that those responsible bear the costs of creating the 
hazard. 9 As conflicting cases illustrate, each court has applied the 
various methods of statutory construction to reach different 
conclusions regarding either Potentially Responsible Party (“PRP”) or 
“innocent landowner” recovery and liability.10 
Although the Supreme Court has not provided specific guidance 
for CERCLA interpretation, it is not a proponent of applying the 
“remedial canon” of statutory construction.11 Nonetheless, a majority 
of lower courts apply the “remedial canon,” which instructs courts to 
                                                 
5 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). 
9 Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA under the Remedial 
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV.199, 279-285 (1996).  
10 Metro. Water Reclamation of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing & 
Coating, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 830, 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2007); Atl. Research Corp. v. 
United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835-37 (8th Cir. 2006); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 522, 543 (3d Cir. 2006); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. 
v. UGI Utils.. Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100, 103-04 (2d Cir.2005); Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. 
v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240, 1243 (7th. 1997); Akzo 
Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1994).  
11 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2332 (2007); Cooper 
Indus., Inc. v. Aviall servs. Inc., 543 U.S. 147, 160 (2004).  
2
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interpret the statute to “achieve the statutes’ broadest underlying 
purpose.”12 Courts applying this canon interpret CERCLA to remedy 
pollution at any cost.13 
Unlike the majority of courts, the Seventh Circuit applies the 
“public choice” theory, which instructs courts to consider statutes as 
“product[s] of compromise.”14 Courts seeking to enforce the bargains 
reached between the legislature and interest groups achieve a middle 
ground in statutory construction.15 Metropolitan Water Reclamation 
District v. North American Galvanizing & Coating, Inc. is a classic 
illustration of the Seventh Circuit’s unique “public choice” approach.16 
The factual underpinnings in Metropolitan Water are such that no 
overwhelming interest overpowers another.17 This allows the Seventh 
Circuit to reach a perfect balance between the two broad goals of 
CERCLA.18 
In other circumstances, the Seventh Circuit has applied the 
“remedial canon” within the framework of the “public choice” theory 
for the limited purpose of avoiding an absurd result.19 For example, 
the Seventh Circuit created the Akzo/Rumpke “innocent landowner” 
exception when none of the other circuits allowed recovery under 
Section 107(a).20 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit avoided rendering 
Section 107(a) recovery a nullity.21 These cases confirm the merit of 
the Seventh Circuit’s application of the “public choice” theory.22 
                                                 
12 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 834, 835, 837; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 460 F.3d at 522-23, 545; Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 423 F.3d at 98-99, 103.  
13 E.I. DuPont., 460 F.3d at 522-23, 545.  
14 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 824, 834, 836-37; Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241-42; 
Akzo, 30 F.3d at 770-71. 
15 See Watson, supra note 9, at 217-18.  
16 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 834, 836-37.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241-42; Akzo, 30 F.3d at 770-71.  
20 Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239-40; Akzo, 30 F.3d at 770. 
21 Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239-40; Akzo, 30 F.3d at 770.  
22Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 834, 836-37; Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1239-40; Akzo., 
30 F.3d at 770. 
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Part I of this article will discuss the context from which CERCLA 
was born, how most courts construe CERCLA through the “remedial 
canon,” and the Seventh Circuit’s views on CERCLA. Part II of this 
article will address the context of Metropolitan Water. Part III of this 
article will discuss the Akzo/Rumpke exception. Part IV of this article 
will discuss the implications of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in 
Metropolitan Water.  
 
PART I 
 
This section will discuss the enactment of CERCLA.  
 
A. CERCLA’s Enactment 
 
CERCLA is a combination of different bills considered in both the 
House and Senate during the end of the Carter Administration.23 
House Report 7020 proposed to create a “superfund” to help finance 
the cleanup of hazardous dumps.24 The House Report accompanying 
House Report 7020 begins with a detailed discussion of the need for 
legislation to respond to “the tragic consequences of improper[], 
negligent[], and reckless[] hazardous waste disposal practices . . . and 
the inadequacy of existing law.”25 The more “remedial” Senate Bill 
1480, which provided for strict liability was struck down.26  
A comparison of the Bills drafted by the House and the Senate 
before the November 1980 election reveals Congress’s differences of 
opinion on many key points.27 The House Bill relied on a common law 
                                                 
23 See Watson, supra note 9, at 290. 
24 See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) v-vii (1983) 
[hereinafter HISTORY OF CERCLA]; Watson, supra note 9, at 290. 
25See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF 
CERCLA, supra note 24, at 48.  
26 See S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 37 (1980), reprinted in HISTORY OF CERCLA, 
supra note 24, at 343. 
27 John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’S MISTAKES, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1405, 1443-44 (1997).  
4
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causation scheme, but the House Bill did not.28 The House Bill 
contained a third party defense to liability while the Senate Bill did 
not.29 The House Bill included a provision governing the 
apportionment of liability among defendants, but the Senate Bill did 
not.30 The Senate Bill specifically attempted to impose “joint and 
several liability” while the House did not.31  
Under time pressure, Congress compromised by striking down the 
most aggressive proposals in both the House and Senate in order to 
ensure CERCLA’s passage.32  
 
B. Statutory Scheme  
 
Section 107(a)(4)(A) provides that PRPs shall be liable for “all 
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States 
Government or a state or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the 
national contingency plan.” Section 107(a)(4)(B), which governs 
private suits, provides that PRPs shall be liable “for any other 
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent 
with the national contingency plan.”33 To establish a prima facie case 
for cost recovery under Section 107(a)(4)(B), a private plaintiff must 
prove four elements: 1) the site at issue is a “facility;” 2) a release or 
threatened release of hazardous substance has occurred; 3) release has 
caused the plaintiff to incur “necessary costs of response” consistent 
with National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) and 4) the defendant falls 
                                                 
28 See Nagle, supra note 27, at 1443-44. 
29 See Nagle, supra note 27, at 1443-44; Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History 
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
(“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6, 16-17, 19 (1982).  
30 See Nagle, supra note 27, 1443-44; Grad, supra note 29, at 5, 10, 17, 19.  
31 See Nagle, supra note 27, 1443-44; Grad supra note 29, at 7, 10, 19.  
32 See Nagle, supra note 27, 1443-44. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
5
Wu: The Seventh Circuit Steps Up on Clenaup of Hazardous Waste
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 596
within one of the four categories of covered persons within Section 
107(a)(1)-(4).34  
Section 113(f)(1) is a provision of SARA, which provides that a 
contribution action could be brought “during or following any civil 
action under Section [106] of this title or under Section [107(a)] of this 
title.”35 Section 113(f)(3)(B), which governs contribution rights, states 
that a “person who has resolved its liability with the United States or a 
State for some or all of the response action or for some or all of the 
costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved 
settlement may seek contribution from any person.”36  
Despite Congress’s deletion of any references to “strict liability,” 
lower courts interpreted the 1986 SARA as a reaffirmation of “strict 
liability.” The reasoning behind this assumption stems from SARA’s 
impractical defenses for PRPs: acts of God, acts of war, act of third 
parties not in a contractual relationship with the defendant, any 
combination of the above as well as immunity for third-parties.37 
Nonetheless, courts have often characterized liability as “strict” and 
“joint and several.”38 “Joint and several” liability means that each and 
every contributor is potentially liable for the entire cleanup.39 
Likewise, “strict liability” holds each PRP responsible for their 
actions.40 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of 
Federal Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 17, 18 (2006); 
NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co., 227 F.3d 776, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2000).  
35 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).  
37 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); See Aronovsky, supra note 34, at 14.  
38 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1); 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 8.13 (1992). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 9601; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 9601; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). 
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PART II 
 
Part II will discuss the background, factual circumstances, and 
holdings in the circuit court split involving whether a PRP, who 
voluntarily commences cleanup, has the right to seek response costs 
under Section 107(a).  
In Cooper Industries v.  Aviall Services Inc., Cooper Industries 
owned four Texas properties until 1981 when it sold them to  Aviall 
Services, Inc.41 After operating those sites for several years,  Aviall 
discovered that both it and Cooper had contaminated the property.42 As 
a result, hazardous substances leaked into the ground and ground 
water.43  Aviall notified the state of the contamination, but neither the 
state nor the federal government took judicial or administrative 
measures to compel cleanup.44 Subsequently,  Aviall brought a Section 
113(f) contribution claim against Cooper after voluntarily 
commencing cleanup. 45 
On December 13, 2004, the Supreme Court issued the much-
anticipated decision in Cooper and held that a person may not seek 
contribution for CERCLA response costs under Section 113(f)(1) in 
the absence of a prior civil action.46 Previously, lower courts had 
construed Section 113 of CERCLA to allow assertion of contribution 
claims by one PRP against another.47 As construed in the past, Section 
107 of CERCLA allowed only those parties that are not liable under 
CERCLA to pursue cost recovery against parties who are potentially 
liable. 48  
The Supreme Court in Cooper significantly limited the 
availability of the CERCLA contribution remedy created by Section 
                                                 
41 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. 543 U.S. 157, 164-65 (2004).  
42 Id  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 166. 
47 Id. at 164-65.  
48 Id. at 169-170.  
7
Wu: The Seventh Circuit Steps Up on Clenaup of Hazardous Waste
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 598
11349—it is no longer available to parties who have conducted 
response actions at CERCLA sites without entering a judicial or 
administrative settlement.50 Post Cooper, courts have addressed the 
narrow issue of whether a PRP had a right to bring an action against 
another PRP for response costs under Section 107 (a).51 
 
A. The Circuit Court Split on Response Costs under Section 107(a) 
 
Given these two provisions, three out of four federal circuit courts 
considering the issue ruled in favor of allowing PRPs to pursue 
Section 107(a) claims against other PRPs: the Second Circuit in 
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. UGI Utilities, Inc.; the Eighth 
Circuit in Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States; and the Seventh 
Circuit in Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater 
Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.52 Each case 
involved a PRP who performed voluntary cleanup.53  
In Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. 
North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., Metropolitan Water 
Reclamation was a water district that owned a 50 acre parcel of land in 
Forest View, Illinois.54 It entered into a long-term lease with Lake 
River Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of North American.55 
Lake River developed the property, constructing a facility to store, mix 
and package industrial chemicals for its own use and for the use of its 
                                                 
49 Id. at 166-67 
50 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007). 
51 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2006); 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 543 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils.. Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 103-04 (2d Cir.2005); 
Metro. Water Reclamation of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coating, 
Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 837 (7th Cir. 2007); Cooper, 543 U.S. at 166.  
52 Atl. Research, 459 F.3d 827 at 836-37; E.I. DuPont, 460 F.3d 515 at 543; 
Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d 90 at 103-04; Metro. Water, 473 F.3d 824 at 837. 
53 Atl. Research, 459 F.3d 827 at 836-37; E.I. DuPont, 460 F.3d 515 at 543; 
Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d 90 at 103-04; Metro. Water, 473 F.3d 824 at 837. 
54 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 825-827. 
55 Id.  
8
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customers. 56 Lake River’s operations involved accepting by truck, 
barge, and rail, large amounts of chemicals that it held in above-
ground storage tanks located on the property.57 The Water District 
alleged that over the course of Lake River’s tenancy, the tank allegedly 
spilled 12,000 gallons of industrial chemicals into the soil and 
groundwater.58 The water district alleged that it had “incurred 
substantial expenses investigating, monitoring and remedying the 
contaminated portions of the property.59 Subsequently, the water 
district sued under Section 107(a) and Section 113(f) to recover costs 
that it voluntarily incurred on property that it had leased to a 
corporation.60 
Similarly, in Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, 
Inc.,, appellant company, Consolidated Edison Co. sought to be 
reimbursed by UGI Utilities Inc. for costs it incurred cleaning up 
certain contaminated sites in Westchester County, New York.61 
Consolidated Edison Co. alleged that UGI or its predecessors operated 
the Westchester plants and that UGI should be liable for costs under 
CERCLA.62 UGI moved for summary judgment on Consolidated 
Edison, finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that UGI is 
subject to operator liability under CERCLA with respect to the 
Westchester Plants not located in Yonkers.63 The district court granted 
UGI’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety and Consolidated 
Edison appealed to the Supreme Court.64  
Likewise, in Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States, appellant 
research corporation retrofitted rocket motors for the United States 
                                                 
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 93-4 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
9
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from 1981 and 1986.65 It performed this service in Camden, Arkansas. 
66 The work included using high-pressure water spray to remove 
rocket propellant.67 Once removed, the propellant was burned. Residue 
from burnt rocket fuel contaminated the Arkansas site’s soil and 
groundwater.68 Appellant sought to recover a portion of the costs of 
cleanup from the United States.69 The District Court for the Western 
District of Arkansas denied their claims.70 Subsequently, appellant 
Atlantic Research Corp. sought response costs from appellee United 
States for costs under the CERCLA.71 
Although the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals provided PRPs with standing within CERCLA, the remedies 
they envisioned were vague and varied as to the type of recovery a 
PRP could claim under Section 107(a).72 The Second Circuit noted 
that “it no longer made sense to view Section 113(f)(1) as the means 
by which the Section 107(a) cost recovery remedy is effected by 
parties that would themselves be liable if sued under Section 
107(a).”73 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit, but 
clarified that a PRP has a cause of action under Section 107(a) based 
on both the theory of cost-recovery and an implied contribution 
theory.74 The Eighth Circuit opened another avenue of recovery, 
stating that “if a plaintiff attempted to use [Section] 107 to recover 
                                                 
65 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2006). 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 835-36 (8th Cir. 2006); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils. Inc., 
423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2005); Metro. Water Reclamation of Greater Chicago v. N. 
Am. Galvanizing & Coating, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 836 (7th Cir. 2007). 
73 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils. Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d 
Cir.2005). 
74 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 835-36; Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 423 
F.3d at 99.  
10
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more than its fair share of reimbursement, a defendant would be free 
to counterclaim for contribution under [Section] 113(f).”75 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has its own unique liability 
scheme.76 The Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan Water decided that 
Metropolitan Water’s action under Section 107 is characterized more 
appropriately as a cost-recovery action than as a claim for 
contribution.77 The Seventh Circuit explained its hesitancy to label 
Metropolitan Water’s right of action under Section 107 as an “implied 
right to contribution.”78 First, the Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan 
Water noted that the Supreme Court in Key Tronic Corp. v. United 
States found “the statute now expressly authorizes a cause of action for 
contribution in [Section] 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and 
somewhat overlapping remedy in [Section] 107.”79 For this reason, the 
Seventh Circuit differed from the Northern District’s opinion that 
labeled the cause of action under Section 107 as an “implied right to 
contribution.”80  
Rather, the Seventh Circuit construed the applicable tort law 
imposing liability “under the technical definition of contribution at 
common law” providing that a “volunteer who is not liable may not 
pursue [a] contribution [claim].”81 For the Seventh Circuit, “Section 
107 (a) only imposes liability on private parties to the extent that there 
have been “necessary costs of response” already incurred.”82 “If no 
costs qualifying under this language have been incurred or awarded 
against the volunteer, then that party has no right to contribution.”83 
In the Third Circuit E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United 
States, appellants, E.I. Dupont were facility owners and operators of 
                                                 
75 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 835-36. 
76 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 836.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 832; Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994). 
80 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d 824 at 836.  
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
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industrial facilities located throughout the United States that are 
contaminated with hazardous waste.84 E.I. DuPont alleged that the 
government was responsible for contamination and sought to recover a 
share of the cleanup costs under Section 107(a) and Section 113(f).85 
The District Court entered summary judgment for the government, and 
E.I. DuPont appealed.86 
The Third Circuit discussed the basis for precluding PRPs from 
pursuing a claim under Section 107(a).87 Drawing a distinction 
between a “sua sponte” environmental cleanup where a PRP 
undertakes cleanup without governmental involvement and a 
“negotiated settlement,” the Third Circuit interpreted SARA to favor 
settlement.88 For the Third Circuit, Congress and not the courts create 
the incentives for environmental cleanups.” 89  
 
B. The Circuit Court Split over the type of PRP liability  
 
The Supreme Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, 
Inc. took notice of the opportunity to impose a type of PRP liability.90 
The Court recognized the issue of whether Cooper Industries, which 
sought to recover a share of its cleanup costs, may pursue a Section 
107(a) recovery action under CERCLA for some form of liability other 
than ‘joint and several’ liability.91 However, Supreme Court expressly 
left this question open and stated that “we think it prudent to withhold 
judgment on these matters.” 92  
                                                 
84 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 525-528 (3rd 
Cir. 2006). 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 542-45. 
88 Id. at 523, 537-40, 541-545. 
89 Id. 
90 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 169-70 (2004).  
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 170. 
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Court precedents have encompassed two liability methods: either 
“several liability” or “joint several liability.”93 Courts have justified 
construing Section 107(a) to allow “joint and several recoveries” 
where the plaintiff may recover 100 % of response costs.94 However, 
courts denying PRPs from bringing a claim under Section 107 justified 
their holdings on the basis that Congress could not have intended to let 
some PRPs recover all of the response costs.95 Understandably, there is 
disagreement among the Second, Eighth, and Seventh Circuit Courts 
over PRP liability under Section 107(a). 96  
The Second Circuit in Consol. Edison found that Section 107(a) 
allowed for full recovery under the theory of “joint and several 
liability” by any person that incurred costs for cleanup.97 The Second 
Circuit does not require plaintiffs’ innocence to receive full costs.98 
Also, legal actions under Section 107(a) should be permitted in order 
to facilitate a counterclaim under Section 113(f)(1), which is a vehicle 
for offsetting contribution claims against another fellow PRP.99 
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit imposed “several liability” 
on PRPs.100 As the Eighth Circuit noted, “the text of § 107(a)(4)(B) 
permits recovery of ‘any other necessary costs of response . . . 
consistent with the national contingency plan.’”101 Such a PRP may 
not use Section 107 to recover its full response costs.102  
                                                 
93 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2006); E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 460 F.3d at 522; Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI 
Utils. Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). 
94 E.I. DuPont., 460 F.3d at 522; Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100. 
95 E.I. DuPont, 460 F.3d at 522. 
96 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 835; E.I. DuPont, 460 F.3d at 522; Consol. 
Edison , 423 F.3d at 100; Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 837. 
97 Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100.  
98 Id. at 99. 
99 Id. at 100. 
100 Atl. Research Corp., 459 F.3d at 835. 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
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Contrary to both the Eighth and Second Circuit, the Third Circuit 
in E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co. v. United States imposed “joint and 
several” liability on PRPS under Section 107(a).103 
 
C. What the Supreme Court Left Open and the Seventh Circuit’s 
Treatment of the Topic 
 
The Supreme Court in the June 2007 decision of Atlantic 
Research re-affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision along with the 
Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit’s narrow holding.104 The Supreme 
Court abrogated the Third Circuit Court’s decision in E.I. DuPont by 
holding that the plain terms of Section 107(a) allowed a PRP to 
recover costs from other PRPs.105 However, the Supreme Court 
avoided deciding what type of PRP liability to impose under Section 
107(a) for a PRP that voluntarily commenced environmental 
cleanup.106 
On this narrow question, the Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan 
Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American 
Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc. avoided imposing a specific type of 
liability upon a PRP, who has voluntarily commenced environmental 
cleanup under Section 107(a).107 In light of how Cooper Industries, 
Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. had foreclosed recovery via an action under 
Section 113(f), the Seventh Circuit found the “innocent landowner” 
exceptions to be of “little value.”108 However, the Seventh Circuit in 
Metropolitan Water has not overruled a Section 107(a) claim for an 
“innocent landowner.”109 Within the narrow context of PRP liability, 
                                                 
103 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 522 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
104 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2332 (2007).  
105 Id. at 2332; E.I. Dupont, 460 F.3d at 544-45. 
106 Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 2339. 
107 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing 
& Coatings, Inc. 473 F.3d 824, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2007). 
108 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 836-37; Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall 
Services, Inc. 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).  
109 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 836-37. 
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the only fact that matters after the Seventh Circuit’s overruling of the 
prior exceptions is whether the landowner had voluntarily commenced 
environmental cleanup.110  
 
PART III 
 
First, this section will discuss the context and tradition from 
which the Seventh Circuit created the “innocent landowner” exception 
in Akzo and Rumpke. Next, this article will discuss the other courts’ 
reactions to the Seventh Circuit’s judicially created exceptions.  
 
A. Creation of the Akzo Exception 
 
In Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., innocent landowners 
forced to cleanup hazardous wastes caused by third party acts or 
migrations from adjacent lands were granted a cause of action under 
Section 107(a).111 The holding in Akzo arose after Akzo Coatings, Inc. 
completed emergency clean-up work by the government and was 
ordered to perform more clean-up work at hazardous sites in 
Indiana.112 Akzo Coatings, Inc. brought suit for contribution against 
Aigner Corporation and a number of other companies that sent 
hazardous wastes to various facilities in Kingsbury, Indiana between 
1972 and 1985.113  
Prior to Akzo, courts uniformly decided that a PRP could not sue 
under Section 107(a) against another PRP.114 However, these courts 
failed to resolve the question of whether an “innocent landowner” 
could bring a cause of action under Section 107(a).115 Thus, the 
                                                 
110 Id. at 836-37.  
111 Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1994).  
112 Akzo, 30 F.3d at 762-64. 
113 Id. at 762-64. 
114 See Aronovsky, supra note 34, at 31. 
115 Id. 
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Seventh Circuit in Akzo was the only circuit court that appeared to be 
concerned about this issue.116  
Three years later in Rumpke of Indiana Inc. v. Cummins Engine 
Co., Inc., the Seventh Circuit again permitted an innocent landowner 
to bring a cause of action for recovery against a PRP under Section 
107(a).117 The holding in Rumpke arose when Rumpke purchased a 
273-acre dump known as Uniontown Landfill from Geroge and Ethel 
Darlage. At that time, the Darlages informed Rumpke that the landfill 
had never accepted hazardous waste. Rumpke did not conduct its own 
inspection of the land for environmental hazards prior to the sale.118 In 
1990, Rumpke alleged it had discovered a cocktail of hazardous 
wastes deposited at Uniontown for many years.119 A consent decree 
was approved in United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp. that 
resolved all obligations and responsibilities of the settling companies 
with respect to “the Seymour site.”120 The present case arose because 
Rumpke pursued response costs from the Seymour settling parties, 
Cummins, Ford Motor Company, International Business Machines 
Corp., General Motors Corp., and Essex Group, Inc. 121  
Together Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp. and Rumpke of 
Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc. created the well-known 
innocent landowner Akzo/Rumpke exception, which was affirmed by 
subsequent cases.122 In Am International v. Datacard Corp., the 
Seventh Circuit applied the “Akzo-exception” by allowing an 
“innocent landowner” to directly sue for response costs.123 Judge 
                                                 
116 Akzo, 30 F.3d at 770-771. 
117 Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1243 
(7th. 1997). 
118 Id. at 1236-38. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 1236-1238; United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F.Supp. 
1334 (S. D. Ind. 1982). 
121 Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1236-38.  
122 NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co., 227 F.3d 776, 791-792 (7th Cir. 
2000); Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1243.; Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 
761, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1994).  
123 Am. Inter., Inc. v. Datacorp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (7th Cir. 1997).  
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 607
Posner found the Datacard Corporation “a little less innocent” than the 
landowner in Akzo because Datacard knew of the future expensive 
cleanup before purchasing the property.124  
 
B. Courts’ Attitude towards the “Akzo-Exception”  
 
The Second Circuit in Bedford Affiliates v. Sills declined to 
recognize a defense for landowners who did not actively contribute to 
the resulting contamination. 125 To do so would mean carving out a 
judicially created defense that Congress did not create.126 Like the 
Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit in Dico Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co. 
prohibited against any expansion of the list of defenses beyond those 
expressed in CERCLA.127 An expansion would constitute an improper 
judicial effort to eschew the underlying purpose of CERCLA. 128  
Some courts have even expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s 
“Akzo-exception.”129 The Ninth Circuit in Western Property Services 
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. found the “Akzo-exception” inconsistent as a 
comprehensive scheme for adjusting the burden among parties liable 
for Section 107(a) recoveries.130 For this reason, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to acknowledge any “non-polluting PRP landowner 
exception.”131 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that a PRP may only 
recover costs under Section 113 as a contribution action under 
CERCLA.132 A proponent of the federal common law, the Ninth 
                                                 
124 Id. at 1347. 
125 Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424-25, 432 (2d Cir. 1998). 
126 Id. 
127 Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 532 (8th. Cir. 2003). 
128 Id.  
129 W. Properties Service Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 690, 692 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
130 Id. at 690, 692. 
131 Id. at 692. 
132 Id. 
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Circuit characterized the “innocent landowner” exception as applying 
to reach equitable rather than textually supported purposes.133 
 
PART IV 
 
Many commentators consider the cost provisions of Section 
107(a) and Section 113(f) to be the most remedial provisions of 
CERCLA since they deal directly with both overriding goals of 
CERCLA—cleanup and allocation of responsibility.134 Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court has always disfavored applying the remedial canon 
of statutory interpretation. 135In the 1960 decision of United States v. 
Republic Steel Corp., the Supreme Court held that the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 must be read “charitably in light of the purpose to 
be served” for granting relief and enjoining defendant pollutants from 
creating pollution.136 Subsequently in Key Tronic Corp. v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that petitioner pollutant was not 
entitled to attorney’s fees from the U.S. government because neither 
Section 107 nor Section 113 expressly mentioned recovery for 
attorney’s fees.137 At no point in the decision did the Supreme Court 
respond affirmatively to the lower court’s assertion that Section 107 
should be liberally construed to achieve the overall objectives of the 
statute.138 
Similarly, Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner’s skepticism of 
purpose arguments especially within CERCLA arises from Judge 
Easterbrook’s view of legislation as a product of compromise.139 As 
Judge Easterbrook stated, “[e]ven if all legislative history points in one 
                                                 
133 Id. at 690. 
134 See Watson, supra note 9, at 286. 
135 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 818-20 (1994); United 
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1960). 
136 362 U.S. at 491-92. 
137 511 U.S. at 818-20.  
138 Id. at 818-20.  
139 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994). 
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direction, it is still necessary to find the compromise to learn the 
meaning of the statute.”140 Similarly, Judge Posner interpreted the 
“public choice theory” to mean that courts “should enforce the 
bargains reached between the legislature and interest groups.”141  
As Judge Posner further elaborated, “legislation is a good 
demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative 
protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, 
regardless of overall social welfare, whether ‘welfare’ is defined as 
wealth, utility, or some other version of equity or justice.”142 For the 
Seventh Circuit, the broadening of rights for environmentally-
aggrieved parties “serve[d] as a necessary and valuable supplement to 
legislative efforts to restore the natural ecology of our cities and 
countryside.”143  
Judge Posner’s primary objection to the “remedial canon” is how 
fails to take into account the role of interest groups “whose clashes 
blunt the thrust of many legislative initiatives.”144 The Seventh 
Circuit’s views are supported by the leading drafter of CERCLA, 
former vice president Al Gore, who considered the development of a 
federal common law interpreting CERCLA to be “improbable.”145 
Concurring with this notion, Judge Easterbrook “does not believe that 
CERCLA is the kind of statute in which Congress intended to rely on 
the courts to fill in the gaps through a common law process.”146 
Rather, under the Seventh Circuit’s view, while many statutory 
questions remain unanswered, no goal is pursued at all costs.147 
                                                 
140 See Watson, supra note 9, at 247. 
141 See id. at 217. 
142 Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, And The Reading Of Statutes And 
The Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1982).  
143 Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat From Judicial Activism: The Seventh 
Circuit And The Environment, 63 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 209, 220-21 (1987); Harrison 
v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1120 (7th Cir. 1976). 
144 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and In the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 809 (1983). 
145 See Nagle, supra note 27, at 1444-45. 
146 See id. at 1444-45. 
147 See id. at 1439-40. 
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A. How the Seventh Circuit employed the “Public Choice” Framework 
by creating the Akzo/Rumpke Exception 
 
The Seventh Circuit in Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins 
Engine Co., Inc. is the closest the Seventh Circuit has ever come to 
applying the “remedial canon” of statutory construction.148 Before 
Rumpke was decided, Section 113 provided a general avenue of 
recovery for an “innocent landowner” to bring a suit against a PRP for 
contaminated land.149 In Rumpke, Section 107(a) became the default 
avenue of recovery for an “innocent landowner.”150 Furthermore, the 
Court in Rumpke explicitly labeled Section 107(a) as providing for 
“strict liability” in the context of “innocent landowners” suing a PRP 
for direct injury.151  
The “polluter pays” principle of CERCLA is achieved by ensuring 
that someone is responsible for cleaning up the contaminated property. 
The alternative to not allowing an “innocent landowner” with a claim 
for recovery is for Section 107(a) to be effectively obsolete as a cost-
provision of CERCLA.152 As the Seventh Circuit in Rumpke noted, “if 
one were to read § 107(a) as implicitly denying standing to sue even to 
landowners like Rumpke who did not create the hazardous conditions, 
this would come perilously close to reading § 107(a) itself out of the 
statute.”153 
 
B. How the Seventh Circuit in Metropolitan Water Utilizes the “Public 
Choice” Theory 
 
                                                 
148 Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 
1241-42 (7th Cir. 1997). 
149 Id. at 1240-1242. 
150 Id. at 1240-1242. 
151 Id. at 1240-41.  
152 Id. at 1241-42. 
153 Id. at 1241-42. 
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The Supreme Court’s attempt in United States v. Atlantic Research 
Corp. to reach the broad goals of CERCLA has pushed it the furthest it 
has ever come to applying the “remedial canon” of statutory 
interpretation.154 First, the United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. 
Court came close to applying “strict liability.”155 Second, the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning showed a clear bias towards promoting settlement 
with the government rather than voluntary cleanup.156  
The Supreme Court in Atlantic justified its earlier holding in 
Cooper that foreclosed a Section 113(f) contribution claim for a PRP 
who has voluntarily commenced cleanup.157 In doing so, the Supreme 
Court denied a potential conflict between the 2 interests of voluntary 
cleanup and settlement.158 By affirmatively barring a potential cause of 
action for contribution, the Court encouraged settlement.159 
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit utilized the 
“public choice” theory of statutory construction in Metropolitan Water 
by inviting the EPA to submit an Amicus brief.160 The EPA was not 
directly involved in Metropolitan Water.161 However, in the amicus 
brief, the EPA articulated concern over discouraging settlement with 
the government by allowing additional avenues of recovery.162 
According to the EPA, the PRP would rather litigate than take any 
immediate action for environmental cleanup.163 
On the other hand, not allowing additional avenues of recovery 
would sacrifice the goal of encouraging the real polluter(s) to take 
                                                 
154 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 2337-39. 
157 Id. at 2337-38. 
158 Id. at 2338. 
159 Id. 
160 Brief for the United States Environmental Protection Agency as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting in Support of the United States of America, Metro. Water 
Reclamation of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coating, Inc., 473 F.3d 
824 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-3299). 
161 Id. at 1.  
162 Id. at 1, 3-4, 18-23. 
163 Id. at 1, 3-4, 18-23. 
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responsibility for pollution. In reply to the EPA’s concern, the Seventh 
Circuit was “sensitive to the EPA’s concerns regarding diminished 
settlement leverage.”164 However, allowing a PRP, who voluntarily 
commenced environmental cleanup to sue another PRP under Section 
107(a) of CERCLA accomplishes the goal of encouraging the real 
polluter to pay for cleanup. 
Furthermore, one of the most important extremes the Seventh 
Circuit avoided was imposing “strict liability” on PRPs within the 
narrow context of a PRP cause of action under Section 107(a).165 
Imposing “strict liability” achieves the goal of “making the polluter 
pay,” but fails to encourage the quickest and most cost-effective 
environmental cleanup. For the Seventh Circuit, it was important to 
avoid reaching the absurd result of imposing 100 % liability upon a 
landowner with no legal recourse.166 Thus, the Seventh Circuit split 
from the Second Circuit, which allowed the imposition of “strict 
liability” under Section 107(a).167 The Second Circuit noted that “strict 
liability” is not too harsh given the availability of a contribution 
counterclaim under Section 113(f).168 To decide otherwise would 
“impermissibly discourag[e] voluntary cleanup.”169  
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit avoided encouraging the 
landowner to wait to be sued rather than to commence cleanup.170 This 
is because strict liability complicates the decision to cooperate by 
reporting or cleaning up hazardous waste. Under strict liability, the 
PRP will compare expected shares of cleanup costs with the value of 
the land because an individual may be held liable for damages 
                                                 
164 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing 
& Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 837 (7th.Cir. 2007). 
165 Id. at 837. 
166 Id. 
167 Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 
100 (2005). 
168 Id.  
169 Id 
170 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 837. 
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regardless of intent to cause the contamination.171 The PRP will also 
have to predict the potential solvency of all PRPs over a period of time 
leading up to and possibly through litigation.172 Due to the 
unpredictability of potential liabilities, the PRP will often litigate to 
recover response costs. Ultimately, an increase in litigation 
discourages quick and efficient environmental cleanup.  
However, unlike some other circuit courts, the Seventh Circuit has 
never expressly denounced “strict liability” either.173 The reason is 
because the Seventh Circuit wished to preserve all the tools of 
statutory interpretation under the “public choice” theory.174  
As the Supreme Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall 
Services, Inc. noted, some courts have expressly denounced “strict 
liability” in order to provide maximum incentives for polluters to 
reveal knowledge of contaminated property for quick and effective 
cleanup.175 Other courts applied strict liability for deterrence 
purposes.176 For example, the Seventh Circuit applied “strict liability 
on PRPs in the “innocent landowner” context in order to make the 
polluter as opposed to the “innocent landowner” to pay for the costs of 
                                                 
171 Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the “Polluter Pays” Principle: 
An Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste, 69 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 624, 668-669 (1994).  
172 See id. at 669-70. 
173 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 837. 
174 Id. 
175 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 169-70 
(2004); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-424 (2nd Cir. 1998); Centerior 
Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 349-356 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, T. & D.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 
1998); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-1306 
(9th Cir. 1997); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120-
1124 (3rd Cir. 1997); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 
1496 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colorado & E.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1534-
1536 (10th Cir. 1995); United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 33 
F.3d 96, 98-103 (1st Cir. 1994). 
176 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 522 (3rd 
Cir. 2006); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 
(2nd Cir. 2005). 
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cleanup.177 Private land ownership is encouraged as potential buyers 
are no longer deterred from buying a piece of contaminated property 
while knowing that the polluter would bear the cost of cleanup. 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to allow “implied 
contribution” recovery contrasts with the Eighth Circuit in Atlantic 
Research Corp. v. United States.178 The Eighth Circuit circumvented 
the plain language of Section 107(a) to allow “implied 
contribution.”179 As the Eighth Circuit stated, “if a plaintiff attempted 
to use § 107 to recover more than its fair share of reimbursement, a 
defendant would be free to counterclaim for contribution under § 
113(f).”180 By allowing both general cost-recovery and contribution, 
the Eighth Circuit has strengthened the PRP’s claim by providing for 
“implied contribution” regardless of fault. 181 In contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit shied away from the kind of judicial activism necessitated by 
use of the “remedial canon” of statutory construction to ensure the 
costs of cleanup are borne by those who are responsible. 182  
Similarly, the Seventh, Eighth, and Second Circuit’s narrow 
holdings are contrasted with the Third Circuit in E.I. DuPont Nemours 
& Co. v. United States.183 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit 
in E.I. DuPont refused to allow an avenue of recovery under Section 
107(a).184 For the Third Circuit, an avenue of recovery would 
discourage settlement with the government.185 However, not allowing 
                                                 
177 Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240 
(7th Cir. 1997); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
178 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835-36 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 836. 
179 Atl Research, 459 F.3d at 835-36. 
180 Id. at 835.  
181 Id. at 835-36.  
182 Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 835-837. 
183 Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 836-37; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
United States, 460 F.3d 515, 543 (3d Cir. 2006); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI 
Utils.. Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 103-04 (2d Cir.2005); Metro. Water, 473 F.3d at 837. 
184 E.I. DuPont, 460 F.3d 515 at 543. 
185 Id. 
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such an avenue of recovery would be directly against creating 
incentives for voluntary private party cleanups.186 To the extent that 
opening up another narrow exception would increase litigation, the 
broad goal of encouraging fast and efficient cleanup is accomplished 
by encouraging a PRP to voluntarily commence cleanup. Furthermore, 
the “polluter pays” principle is furthered when a PRP recovers costs 
from other PRPs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s “public choice” theory offers the best 
interpretation of CERCLA because it furthers the two different and 
conflicting goals of CERCLA. Courts want to encourage clean up of 
hazardous waste sites quickly and effectively. However, Courts also 
want to ensure that the polluters bear the costs for cleaning up the 
hazardous condition. As such, the existence and degree of conflict 
between the two goals of CERCLA will be dependent upon the 
particular factual circumstances and legal context. Each court 
construing CERCLA in a particular factual circumstance and trying to 
further a particular goal, must be aware of competing interests. The 
“public choice” theory offers the solution in each circumstance 
because legislation is a product of compromise that requires reaching a 
middle-ground among competing interests.  
While the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit that employs the 
“public choice” theory with regard to CERCLA interpretation, it has 
done so to reach the most equitable results. For example, in Akzo and 
Rumpke, the Seventh Circuit was the first court to address the issue of 
Section 107(a) recovery for either an “innocent landowner” or a PRP. 
In creating the “Akzo/Rumpke” “innocent landowner” exception and 
imposing “strict liability” on PRPs, the Seventh Circuit advanced the 
“polluter pays” principle of CERCLA. 
Metropolitan Water represents a classic application of the “public 
choice” theory. The Supreme Court’s arresting remiss of directive in 
either statutory construction or principle on the issue of PRP liability 
                                                 
186 See Gergen, supra note 171, at 672-73.  
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left the Seventh Circuit and many circuit courts in a precarious 
situation. In affirmation of Akzo and Rumpke, the Seventh Circuit 
carved out another narrow exception within Section 107(a) for PRPs, 
who had voluntarily commenced cleanup. In doing so, the Seventh 
Circuit encouraged quick and effective cleanup. The Seventh Circuit 
also avoided the extremes of some other the circuit courts by not 
imposing “strict liability” on PRPs or labeling cost recovery under 
Section 107(a) as “implied contribution.” Applying the “public 
choice” theory, the Seventh Circuit has continuously expanded the 
interests of all environmentally aggrieved parties.  
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